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Abstract
Existing adversarial learning approaches mostly use class labels to generate adver-
sarial samples that lead to incorrect predictions, which are then used to augment the
training of the model for improved robustness. While some recent works propose
semi-supervised adversarial learning methods that utilize unlabeled data, they still
require class labels. However, do we really need class labels at all, for adversarially
robust training of deep neural networks? In this paper, we propose a novel adver-
sarial attack for unlabeled data, which makes the model confuse the instance-level
identities of the perturbed data samples. Further, we present a self-supervised con-
trastive learning framework to adversarially train a robust neural network without
labeled data, which aims to maximize the similarity between a random augmenta-
tion of a data sample and its instance-wise adversarial perturbation. We validate
our method, Robust Contrastive Learning (RoCL), on multiple benchmark datasets,
on which it obtains comparable robust accuracy over state-of-the-art supervised
adversarial learning methods, and significantly improved robustness against the
black box and unseen types of attacks. Moreover, with further joint fine-tuning
with supervised adversarial loss, RoCL obtains even higher robust accuracy over
using self-supervised learning alone. Notably, RoCL also demonstrate impressive
results in robust transfer learning.
1 Introduction
The vulnerability of neural networks to imperceptibly small perturbations [1] has been a crucial
challenge in deploying them to safety-critical applications, such as autonomous driving. Various
studies have been proposed to ensure the robustness of the trained networks against adversarial
attacks [2, 3, 4], random noise [5], and corruptions [6, 7]. Perhaps the most popular approach to
achieve adversarial robustness is adversarial learning, which trains the model with samples perturbed
to maximize the loss on the target model. Starting from Fast Gradient Sign Method [8] which apply a
perturbation in the gradient direction, to Projected Gradient Descent [9] that maximizes the loss over
iterations, and TRADES [2] that trades-off clean accuracy and adversarial robustness, adversarial
learning has evolved substantially over the past few years. However, conventional methods with
adversarial learning all require class labels to generate adversarial attacks.
Recently, self-supervised learning [10, 11, 12, 13, 14], which trains the model on unlabeled data in
a supervised manner by utilizing self-generated labels from the data itself, has become popular as
means of learning representations for deep neural networks. For example, prediction of the rotation
angles [10], and solving randomly generated Jigsaw puzzles [11] are examples of such self-supervised
learning methods. Recently, instance-level identity preservation [12, 13] with contrastive learning
has shown to be very effective in learning the rich representations for classification. Contrastive
self-supervised learning frameworks such as [12, 13, 14] basically aim to maximize the similarity of
a sample to its augmentation, while minimizing its similarity to other instances.
In this work, we propose a contrastive self-supervised learning framework to train an adversarially
robust neural network without any class labels. Our intuition is that we can fool the model by generat-
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(a) Instance-wise adversarial examples (b) RoCL: Robust contrastive learning
(c) RoCL: Robust contrastive
learning
Figure 1: Overview of our adversarial contrastive self-supervised learning. (a) We generate instance-wise
adversarial examples from an image transformed using a stochastic augmentation, which makes the model
confuse the instance-level identity of the perturbed sample. (b) We then maximize the similarity between each
transformed sample and their instance-wise adversaries using contrastive learning. (c) After training, each
sample will have significantly reduced adversarial vulnerability in the latent representation space.
ing instance-wise adversarial examples (See Figure 1(a)). Specifically, we generate perturbations on
augmentations of the samples to maximize their contrastive loss, such that the instance-level classifier
becomes confused about the identities of the perturbed samples. Then, we maximize the similarity
between clean samples and their adversarial counterparts using contrastive learning (Figure 1(b)), to
obtain representations that suppress distortions caused by adversarial perturbations. This will result
in learning representations that are robust against adversarial attacks (Figure 1(c)).
We refer to this novel adversarial self-supervised learning method as Robust Contrastive Learning
(RoCL). To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to train robust neural networks without
any labels, and to generate instance-wise adversarial examples. Recent works on semi-supervised
adversarial learning [15, 16] or self-supervised adversarial learning [17] still require labeled instances
to generate pseudo-labels on unlabeled instances or class-wise attacks for adversarial training, and
thus cannot be considered as fully-unsupervised adversarial learning approaches.
To verify the efficacy of the proposed RoCL, we suggest a robust-linear evaluation for self-supervised
adversarial learning and validate our method on benchmark datasets (CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100)
against supervised adversarial learning approaches. The results show that RoCL obtains comparable
accuracy to strong supervised adversarial learning methods such as TRADES [2], although it does not
use any labels during training. Further, when we extend the method to utilize class labels to fine-tune
the network trained on RoCL with class-adversarial loss, we achieve even stronger robustness, without
losing accuracy when clean samples. Moreover, we verify our rich robust representation with transfer
learning which shows impressive performance. In sum, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose a novel instance-wise adversarial perturbation method which does not require
any labels, by making the model confuse its instance-level identity.
• We propose a adversarial self-supervised learning method to explicitly suppress the vul-
nerability in the representation space by maximizing the similarity between clean examples
and their instance-wise adversarial perturbations.
• Our method obtains comparable robustness to supervised adversarial learning approaches
without using any class labels on the target attack type, while achieving significantly better
clean accuracy and robustness on unseen type of attacks and transfer learning.
2 Related Work
Adversarial robustness Obtaining deep neural networks that are robust to adversarial attacks has
been an active topic of research since Szegedy et al.[1] first showed their fragility to imperceptible
distortions. Goodfellow et al.[8] proposed the fast gradient sign method (FGSM), which perturbs a
target sample to its gradient direction, to increase its loss, and also use the generated samples to train
the model for improved robustness. Follow-up works [9, 18, 19, 20] proposed iterative variants of the
gradient attack with improved adversarial learning frameworks. After these gradient-based attacks
have become standard in evaluating the robustness of deep neural networks, many more defenses
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followed, but Athalye et al. [21] showed that many of them appear robust only because they mask out
the gradients, and proposed new types of attacks that circumvent gradient obfuscation. Recent works
focus on the vulnerability of the latent representations, hypothesizing them as the main cause of the
adversarial vulnerability of deep neural networks. TRADES [2] uses Kullback-Leibler divergence
loss between a clean example and its adversarial counterpart to push the decision boundary, to obtain
a more robust latent space. Ilyas et al. [22] showed the existence of imperceptible features that help
with the prediction of clean examples but are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. On the other hand,
instead of defending the adversarial attacks, guarantee the robustness become one of the solutions to
the safe model. Li et al.[23], "randomized smoothing" technique has been empirically proposed as
certified robustness. Then, Cohen et al. [24], prove the robustness guarantee of randomized smoothing
in `2 norm adversarial attack. Moreover, to improve the performance of randomized smoothing
[25] directly attack the smoothed classifier. A common requirement of existing adversarial learning
techniques is the availability of class labels, since they are essential in generating adversarial attacks.
Recently, semi-supervised adversarial learning [15, 16] approaches have proposed to use unlabeled
data and achieved large enhancement in adversarial robustness. Yet, they still require a portion of
labeled data, and does not change the class-wise nature of the attack. Contrarily, in this work, we
propose instance-wise adversarial attacks that do not require any class labels.
Self-supervised learning As acquiring manual annotations on data could be costly, self-supervised
learning, which generates supervised learning problems out of unlabeled data and solves for them, is
gaining increasingly more popularity. The convention is to train the network to solve a manually-
defined (pretext) task for representation learning, which will be later used for a specific supervised
learning task (e.g., image classification). Predicting the relative location of the patches of images
[26, 27, 11] has shown to be a successful pretext task, which opened the possibility of self-supervised
learning. Gidaris et al. [10] propose to learn image features by training deep networks to recognize
the 2D rotation angles, which largely outperforms previous self-supervised learning approaches.
Corrupting the given images with gray-scaling [28] and random cropping [29], then restoring them
to their original condition, has also shown to work well. Recently, leveraging the instance-level
identity is becoming a popular paradigm for self-supervised learning due to its generality. Using the
contrastive loss between two different transformed images from one identity [12, 13, 30] have shown
to be highly effective in learning the rich representations, which achieve comparable performance to
fully-supervised models. Moreover, even with the labels, the contrastive loss leverage the performance
of the model than using the cross-entropy loss [31].
Self-supervised learning and adversarial robustness Recent works have shown that using unla-
beled data could help the model to obtain more robust representations [15]. Moreover, [32] shows
that a model trained with self-supervision improves the robustness. Even finetuning the pretrained
self-supervised learning helps the robustness [17], and self-supervised adversarial training coupled
with the K-Nearest Neighbour classification improves the robustness of KNN [33]. However, to the
best of our knowledge, none of these previous works explicitly target for adversarial robustness on
unlabeled training. Contrarily, we propose a novel instance-wise attack, which leads the model to
predict an incorrect instance for an instance-discrimination problem. This allows the trained model to
obtain robustness that is on par or even better than supervised adversarial learning methods.
3 Adversarial Self-Supervised Learning with Instance-Wise Attacks
We now describe how to obtain adversarial robustness in the representations without any class labels,
using instance-wise attacks and adversarial self-supervised contrastive learning. Before describing
ours, we first briefly describe supervised adversarial training and self-supervised contrastive learning.
Adversarial robustness We start with the definition of adversarial attacks under supervised settings.
Let us denote the dataset D = {X,Y }, where x ∈ X is training sample and y ∈ Y is a corresponding
label, and a supervised learning model fθ : X → Y where θ is parameters of the model. Given such
a dataset and a model, adversarial attacks aim towards finding the worst-case examples nearby by
searching for the perturbation, which maximizes the loss within a certain radius from the sample
(e.g., norm balls). We can define such adversarial attacks as follows:
xi+1 = ΠB(x,)(x
i − αsign(∇xiLCE(θ, xi, y)) (1)
where B(x, ) is the `∞ norm-ball around x with radius , and Π is the projection function for
norm-ball. The α is the step size of the attacks and sign(·) returns the sign of the vector. Further,
LCE is the cross-entropy loss for supervised training, and i is the number of attack iterations. This
3
formulation generalizes across different types of gradient attacks. For example, Projected Gradient
Descent (PGD) [9] starts from a random point within the x±  and perform i gradient steps, to obtain
an attack xi+1.
The simplest and most straightforward way to defend against such adversarial attacks is to minimize
the loss of adversarial examples, which is often called adversarial learning. The adversarial learning
framework proposed by Madry et al.[9] solve the following non-convex outer minimization problem
and non-convex inner maximization problem where δ is the perturbation of the adversarial images,
and x+ δ is an adversarial example xadv , as follow:
argmin
θ
E(x,y)∼D[ max
δ∈B(x,)
LCE(θ, x+ δ, y)] (2)
In standard adversarial learning framework, including PGD [9], TRADES [2], and many others,
generating such adversarial attacks require to have a class label y ∈ Y . Thus, conventional adversarial
attacks are inapplicable to unlabeled data.
Self-supervised contrastive learning The self-supervised contrastive learning framework [12, 13]
aims to maximize the agreement between different augmentations of the same instance in the learned
latent space while minimizing the agreement between different instances. Let us define some notions
and briefly recap the SimCLR. To project the image into a latent space, SimCLR uses an encoder
fθ(·) network followed by a projector, which is a two-layer multi-layer perceptron (MLP) gpi(·) that
projects the features into latent vector z. SimCLR uses a stochastic data augmentation t, randomly
selected from the family of augmentations T , including random cropping, random color distortion,
and random Gaussian blur. Applying any two transformations, t, t′ ∼ T , will yield two samples
denoted t(x) and t′(x), that are different in appearance but retains the instance-level identity of the
sample. We define t(x)’s positive set as {xpos} = t′(x) from the same original sample x, while the
negative set {xneg} as the set of pairs containing the other instances x′. Then, the contrastive loss
function Lcon can be defined as follows:
Lcon,θ,pi(x, {xpos}, {xneg}) := − log
∑
{zpos} exp(sim(z, {zpos})/τ)∑
{zpos} exp(sim(z, {zpos})/τ) +
∑
{zneg} exp(sim(z, zneg)/τ)
,
(3)
where z, {zpos}, and {zneg} are corresponding 128-dimensional latent vectors (z) of x obtained by
the encoder and projector z = p(fθ(x)), {xpos}, and {xneg}, respectively. The standard contrastive
learning only contains a single sample in the positive set {pos}, which is t(x). The sim(u, v) =
uT v/‖u‖‖v‖ denote cosine similarity between two vectors and τ is a temperature parameter.
We show that standard contrastive learning, such as SimCLR, is vulnerable to the adversarial attacks
as shown in Table 1. To achieve robustness with such self-supervised contrastive learning frameworks,
we need a way to adversarially train them, which we will describe in the next subsection.
3.1 Adversarial Self-supervised Contrative Learning
We now introduce a simple yet novel and effective approach to adversarially train a self-supervised
learning model, using unlabeled data, which we coin as robust contrastive learning (RoCL). RoCL
is trained without a class label by using instance-wise attacks, which makes the model confuse
the instance-level identity of a given sample. Then, we use a contrastive learning framework to
maximize the similarity between a transformed example and the instance-wise adversarial example
of another transformed example. Algorithm 1 summarizes our robust contrastive learning framework
in supplementary B.
Instance-wise adversarial attacks Since class-wise adversarial attacks for existing approaches are
inapplicable to the unlabeled case we target, we propose a novel instance-wise attack. Specifically,
given a sample of an input instance, we generate a perturbation to fool the model by confusing its
instance-level identity; such that it mistakes it as an another sample. This is done by generating
a perturbation that maximizes the self-supervised contrastive loss for discriminating between the
instances, as follows:
t(x)i+1 = ΠB(t(x),)(t(x)
i − αsign(∇t(x)iLcon,θ,pi(t(x)i, {t′(x)}, {t(x)neg})) (4)
where t(x) and t′(x) are transformed images with stochastic data augmentations t, t′ ∼ T , and
t(x)neg are the negative instances for t(x), which are examples of other samples x′.
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(a) Robust contrastive learning training (b) Linear evaluation. (Adversarial training op-tional)
Figure 2: Adversarial training and evaluation steps for RoCL. During adversarial training, we maximize
the similarity between two differently transformed examples {t(x), t′(x)} and their adversarial perturbations
t(x)adv . After the model is fully trained to obtain robustness, then we evaluate the model on the target
classification task by using linear model instead of projector. Here, we could either train the linear classifier only
on clean examples, or adversarially train it with class-adversarial examples.
Robust Contrastive Learning (RoCL) We now present a framework to learn robust representation
via self-supervised contrastive learning. The adversarial learning objective for an instance-wise attack,
following the min-max formulation of [9] could be given as follows:
argmin
θ,pi
E(x)∼D[ max
δ∈B(t(x),)
Lcon,θ,pi(t(x) + δ, {t′(x)}, {t(x)neg})] (5)
where t(x) + δ is the adversarial image t(x)adv generated by instance-wise attacks (eq. 4). Note
that we generate the adversarial example of x using a stochastically transformed image t(x), rather
than the original image x, which will allow us to generate diverse attack samples. This adversarial
learning framework is essentially the same as the supervised adversarial learning framework, except
that we train the model to be robust against m-way instance-wise adversarial attacks. Note that the
proposed regularization can be interpreted as a denoiser. Since the contrastive objective maximize
the similarity between clean samples: t(x), t′(x) , and generated adversarial example, t(x)adv .
We generate label-free adversarial examples using instance-wise adversarial attacks in equation 4.
Then we use the contrastive learning objective to maximize the similarity between clean examples
and their instance-wise perturbation. This is done using a simple modification of the contrastive
learning objective in Eq. 3, by using the instance-wise adversarial examples as additional elements in
the positive set. Then we can formulate our Robust Contrastive Learning objective as follow:
LRoCL,θ,pi(t(x), {t′(x), t(x)adv}, {t(x)neg})
:= − log
∑
{zpos} exp(sim(z, {zpos})/τ)∑
{zpos} exp(sim(z, {zpos})/τ) +
∑
{zneg} exp(sim(z, {zneg})/τ)
,
(6)
where t(x)adv are the adversarial perturbation of an augmented sample t(x), and t′(x) is another
stochastic augmentation. The {zpos}, which is the set of positive samples in the latent feature space,
is compose of z′ and zadv which are latent vectors of t′(x) and t(x)adv respectively. The {zneg} is
the set of latent vectors for negative samples in {t(x)neg}.
Linear Evaluation of RoCL With RoCL, we can adversarially train the model without any class
labels (Figure 2a). Yet, since the model is trained for instance-wise classification, it cannot be directly
used for class-level classification. Thus, existing self-supervised learning models leverage linear
evaluation [28, 34, 35, 12], which learns a linear layer lψ(·) on top of the fixed fθ(·) embedding layer
(Figure 2b) with clean examples. While RoCL achieves impressive robustness with this standard
evaluation (Table 1), to properly evaluate the robustness against a specific type of attack, we propose
a new evaluation protocol which we refer to as robust-linear evaluation (r-LE). r-LE trains a linear
classifier with class-level adversarial examples of specific attack (e.g. `∞) with the fixed encoder as
follows:
argmin
ψ
E(x,y)∼D[ max
δ∈B(x,)
LCE(ψ, x+ δ, y)] (7)
where LCE is the cross-entropy that only optimize parameters of linear model ψ. While we propose
r-LE as an evaluation measure, it could be also used as an efficient means of obtaining an adversarially
robust network using network pretrained using self-supervised learning.
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Table 1: Experimental results with white box attacks on ResNet18 and ResNet50 trained on the CIFAR-10 .
r-LE denotes robust linear evaluation, and SCL is the supervised contrastive learning [31] which uses the labels
in the contrastive loss. Baselines with * are the models with our data augmentation applied during training. AT
denotes the supervised adversarial training[9], and SS denotes the self-supervised loss. tInf is the test inference
by the transformed smoothed classifier with 30 iterations. Rot+pretrained is the model [17] which finetunes the
network trained with rotation-prediction self-supervised learning. For a fair comparison, we report the single
self-supervised model pretrained version with the ResNet50-v2 model. + is the reported performance of [17].
All models are trained with `∞; thus the `∞ is the seen adversarial attack and `2, and `1 attacks are unseen.
Train
type Method
ResNet18 ResNet50
Anat
seen unseen
Anat
seen unseen
`∞ `2 `1 `∞ `2 `1
 8/255 16/255 0.25 0.5 7.84 12  8/255 16/255 0.25 0.5 7.84 12
Supervised
LCE 92.82 0.00 0.00 20.77 12.96 28.47 15.56 93.12 0.00 0.00 13.42 3.44 28.78 13.98
AT[9] 81.63 44.50 14.47 72.26 59.26 66.74 55.74 84.03 46.76 17.63 72.98 58.78 65.28 52.45
TRADES[2] 77.03 48.01 22.55 68.07 57.93 62.93 53.79 82.10 53.49 25.18 73.01 61.94 65.48 54.52
TRADES*[2] 73.26 42.71 17.71 65.25 56.13 62.89 55.95 75.65 46.20 20.96 67.02 57.12 62.46 55.09
SCL[31] 94.05 0.08 0.00 22.17 10.29 38.87 22.58 95.02 0.00 0.00 16.72 1.68 39.44 22.59
Semi-Supervised RST[15] 86.39 56.57 25.98 78.12 67.54 72.24 61.51 - - - - - - -
Self
-supervised
SimCLR[12] 91.25 0.63 0.08 15.3 2.08 41.49 25.76 92.69 0.07 0.00 25.13 3.85 50.17 31.63
RoCL 83.71 40.27 9.55 66.39 63.82 79.21 76.17 85.99 43.56 11.38 70.87 67.59 82.65 80.02
RoCL+rLE 80.43 47.69 15.53 68.30 66.19 77.31 75.05 80.79 45.33 16.85 67.14 64.61 77.54 75.76
Self
-supervised
+finetune
Rot. Pretrained[17] - - - - - - - 85.66+ 50.40+ - - - - -
RoCL+AT 80.26 40.77 22.83 68.64 56.25 65.16 56.07 82.72 50.60 18.83 72.12 70.03 81.02 79.22
RoCL+TRADES 84.55 43.85 14.29 73.01 60.03 68.25 58.04 85.41 45.68 21.21 74.06 59.60 65.37 53.54
RoCL+AT+SS 91.34 49.66 14.44 70.75 61.55 83.08 81.18 84.67 52.44 19.53 76.61 66.38 72.76 64.56
Transformation
smoothed
classifier
TRADES+tInf 77.71 52.73 31.55 70.25 62.13 66.04 58.43 81.94 57.23 34.31 74.46 65.65 68.62 59.66
RoCL+tInf 84.11 52.58 18.55 81.15 76.01 82.13 80.40 86.97 53.39 18.56 84.19 76.90 85.17 83.68
RoCL+rLE+tInf 81.26 53.85 21.22 78.69 73.83 79.74 78.02 80.14 57.50 26.28 77.09 73.86 78.20 77.31
Transformation smoothed inference We further propose a simple inference method for robust
representation. Previous works [25, 24] proposed smoothed classifiers, which obtain smooth decision
boundaries for the final classifier by taking an expectation over classifiers with Gaussian noise per-
turbed samples. This method addresses the problem with sharp classifiers obtained using supervised
learning, which may result in misclassification of the points even with small perturbations. Inspired
by this, we observe that our objective enforces to assemble all differently transformed images into the
adjacent area, and propose a novel transformation smoothed classifier for RoCL, which predicts the
class c by calculating expectation E over the transformation t ∼ T for a given input x as follows:
S(x) = argmax
c∈Y
Et∼T (l(f(t(x))) = c) (8)
4 Experimental Results
We verify the efficacy of our RoCL in various settings against both supervised adversarial learning
methods, and self-supervised pretraining with adversarial finetuning. We report the results of white-
box and black-box attacks in Table 1 and 2, respectively, under ResNet18, ResNet50 [36] trained on
CIFAR-10 [37]. We evaluate multiple versions of our model on diverse scenarios : models trained
with RoCL only, with self-supervised learning only (RoCL, RoCL+rLE), models that use RoCL for
pretraining and perform further standard adversarial training with class-wise attacks (RoCL+AT,
RoCL+TRADES, RoCL+AT+SS), and the RoCL with the transformation smoothed classifier. For
all baselines and our method, we train with the same attack strength of  = 16/255. For results on
CIFAR-100 and details of the evaluation setup, please see the supplementary C.
4.1 Main results
Self-supervised adversarial learning To our knowledge, our RoCL is the first attempt to achieve
robustness in a fully self-supervised learning setting, since existing approaches used self-supervised
learning as a pretraining step before supervised adversarial training. We first compare RoCL against
SimCLR[12], which is a vanilla self-supervised contrastive learning model. The result shows that the
vanilla model is extremely vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, RoCL achieves high robustness
against the target `∞ attacks, outperforming supervised adversarial training by Madry et al. [9], and
obtaining comparable performance to TRADES [2]. This is an impressive result which demonstrates
that it is possible to train adversarially robust models without any labeled data. Note that while we
used the same number of instances in this experiment, in practice, we can use any number of unlabeled
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Table 2: Performance of RoCL against black box
attacks on the CIFAR-10. Each column denotes the
black box model used to generate the `∞ adversarial
images with  = 8/255 and 16/255, respectively. The
row is the target model that is trained with `∞.
ResNet18
Target
Source 8/255 16/255
AT TRADES AT TRADES
AT [9] - 77.48 - 63.87
TRADES [2] 60.73 - 41.87 -
RoCL 66.76 77.33 41.97 62.98
Table 3: Experimental results of transfer learning on
ResNet18 trained on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
dataset, respectively. We compare with the freezed trans-
fered model in [38]. The model is modified WRN 32-
10 [39]. + is the reported performance of [38].
source target Method Anat `∞
CIFAR-100 CIFAR-10 Transfer
+[38] 72.05 17.70
RoCL 73.93 18.62
CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 Transfer
+[38] 41.59 11.63
RoCL 45.84 15.33
Table 4: Attack target image ablation
`∞ train/`∞ test Anat 8/255 16/255
original x 87.96 36.6 11.78
t′(x) 83.71 40.27 9.55
Table 5: Attack iteration ablation
`∞ train/`∞ test 20 40 100
RoCL 40.27 39.80 39.74
Table 6: Ablation on the attack loss type
`∞ train/`∞ test

Lθ,pi Anat 8/255 16/255
Contrastive 83.71 40.27 9.55
MSE 88.35 40.12 7.88
Cosine similarity 73.49 9.30 0.06
MD 84.40 21.05 1.65
data available to train the model, which may lead to larger performance improvements. To show that
this is not the effect of using augmented samples for self-supervised learning, we applied the same
set of augmentations for TRADES (TRADES*), but it obtains worse performance over the original
TRADES. Moreover, RoCL obtains much better clean accuracy, and significantly higher robustness
over the supervised adversarial learning approaches against unseen types of attacks (See the results on
`2, `1 attacks in Table 1), and black box attacks (See Table 2). This makes RoCL more appealing over
baselines, and suggests that our method of using instance-wise attacks and suppression of distortion
at the latent representation space is a more fundamental solution to ensure robustness against general
types of attacks. This point is made more clear in the comparison of RoCL against RoCL with linear
evaluation (RoCL+rLE), which trains the linear classifier with class-wiser adversaries. RoCL+rLE
improves the robustness against the target `∞ attacks, but degenerates robustness on unseen types of
attacks. Finally, with our proposed transformation smoothed classifier, RoCL obtains even stronger
performance on unseen types of attacks (Table 1, the last three rows).
Self-supervised based adversarial fine-tuning Existing works have shown that [40, 17] pretraining
the networks with supervised or self-supervised learning improve adversarial robustness. This is also
confirmed with our results in Table 1, which show that the models fine-tuned with our method obtain
even better robustness and higher clean accuracy over models trained from scratch. We observe that
using self-supervised loss during adversarial finetuning further improves robustness. Moreover, our
method outperforms on robustness compares to the single self-supervised adversarially pretrained
model with adversarially finetuned in the previous work [17].
Comparison to semi-supervised learning Recently, semi-supervised learning[15, 16] have been
shown to largely enhance the adversarial robustness of deep networks, by exploiting unlabeled data.
However, they eventually require labeled data, to generate pseudo-labels on the unlabeled samples,
and to generate class-wise adversaries. Also, they assume the availability of a larger dataset to improve
robustness on the target dataset and require extremely large computation resources. Compared to the
semi-supervised learning methods, RoCL takes about 1/4 times faster with the same computation
resources. Moreover, ours acquires sufficiently high clean accuracy and robustness after 500 epochs
(Fig. 3(c)) which takes 25 hours with two RTX 2080 GPUs.
Results on black box attacks We also validate our models in black box attacks setting. We generate
the adversarial examples on AT, and TRADES model and test to four different models. As you can
see in Table 2, our model is superior than the TRADES [2] at AT black box images. Also, our model
even shows comparable performance to AT [9] model in the TRADES black box images.
Transformation smoothed classifier Transformation smoothed classifier can boost the accuracy of
not only our models but also in the other models that use the stochastic transformation during training.
However, compared to the TRADES in Table 1, we obtain a larger margin in robustness through the
transformation smoothed classifier. Intuitively, since we enforce differently transformed samples to
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(a) TSNE of SimCLR (b) TSNE of RoCL (c) Learning curve of RoCL (d) Black box robustness
Figure 3: (a,b) Visualizations of the embedding of instance-wise adversarial examples and clean examples for
SimCLR and RoCL. (c) The learning curve of ResNet18 RoCL. (d) The transformation smoothed classifier
performance on AT’s black box attack over iteration.
agree, when we operate different transformations on one sample, the latent vectors will be placed in
similar representation space. Therefore, we can calculate the transformation ball around the samples
which acts as Gaussian ball in [24]. Accordingly, compare to the TRADES, we can obtain smoother
classifier and able to acquire better gain in robustness not only white box attacked images, but also
in black box images 3(d). As shown in Fig. 3(d), as iteration number increases the robustness also
increase. The best part of the transformation smoothed classifier is that we do not have any trade-off
in clean accuracy (Table 1).
Transfer learning Unsupervised learning representation has the benefit of applying to the other
downstream not only the classification. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our works on transfer
learning in Table 3. Surprisingly, our model shows high clean accuracy and high robustness in
both CIFAR-100 and CIFAR-10 when the source model is trained with CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100
respectively, without any other additional loss. Since our method learns rich robust representation, our
model shows even better transfer results compare to the fully supervised robust transfer learning[38].
The more experiment results of transfer learning are in the supplementary A.
4.2 Ablation study
Instance-wise attack verification We verify our instance-wise attacks on SimCLR (Fig. 3(a)). Our
attacks generate the confusing samples as red edge markers which are far apart from the identical
instances. Even though the same shapes are placed in adjacent space except for adversarial examples
which are all identical samples but differently transformed. However, if we train the model with
RoCL (Fig. 3(b)), instance-wise attacks are gathered with transformed images of the same identity.
Attack target image ablation Since our RoCL is an instance discriminative model, we can use any
identity for the target for the attack. As shown in Table 5, even when we use the original x for the
attacks, our RoCL still shows high natural accuracy along with high robustness. This is because the
key to our method is matching the instance-level identity which is not biased with transformation.
Therefore, our methods show stable performance with any kind of target which has the same identity.
Attack loss (L) Various distance measures can be used to compute the distance between two samples
in the representation space. Here, we apply four different distance functions: mean square error
(MSE), cosine similarity, Manhattan distance (MD), and contrastive loss. The results in Table 6
shows that contrastive loss is the most effective attack loss, compared to others.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we tackled a novel problem of learning robust representations without any class labels.
We first proposed a instance-wise attack to make the model confuse the instance-level identity
of a given sample. Then, we proposed a robust contrastive learning framework to suppress their
adversarial vulnerability by maximizing the similarity between a transformed sample and its instance-
wise adversary. Furthermore, we demonstrate an effective transformation smoothed classifier which
boosts our performance during the test inference. We validated our method on multiple benchmarks
with different neural architectures, on which it obtained comparable robustness to the supervised
baselines on the targeted attack without any labels. Notably, RoCL obtained significantly better clean
accuracy and better robustness against black box, unseen attacks, and transfer learning, which makes
it more appealing as a general defense mechanism. Our work opened a door to more interesting
follow-up works on unsupervised adversarial learning, which we believe is a more fundamental
solution to achieving adversarial robustness with deep neural networks.
8
Broader Impact
The adversarial example brought alertness to blind deep learning beliefs. Due to the adversarial
example, it is necessary to consider the vulnerability of deep learning, and we have been doing
various studies to make deep learning more secure. To make a more robust model, we always present
new strong attacks which is an additional concern to the research field. However, we can prevent
those attacks by using adversarial training. Even though advanced attacks introduce, it is necessary to
find a way to deal with those vulnerabilities. In such a paradigm, we should not allow vulnerabilities
even for models that learn without labels. We believe that this is the first prominent step toward using
safer deep learning in the field of self-supervised learning.
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Supplementary
Adversarial Self-Supervised Contrastive Learning
Organization The supplementary file is organized as follows. In section A, we describe the experimental
details, including the descriptions of the datasets and the evaluation process. We then provide an algorithm
which summarizes our RoCL in section B. Then, we further report the RoCL results on both CIFAR 10 and
CIFAR 100 against PGD attacks and CW attacks in Section C. Finally, perform ablation studies of our RoCL in
section D.
A Experimental Setup
A.1 Training detail and dataset
CIFAR 10 The CIFAR 10 [37] dataset consists of 60,000 RGB images of size 32 × 32, from ten general
object classes. The dataset consists of 5,000 training images and 1,000 test images for each class. We use
ResNet18 and ResNet50 [36] for this dataset without any linear layers. For the projector network we set the
output dimension as 128. For adversarial training parameters, we set the perturbation  = 0.0314 , step size
α = 0.007, and number of iteration K = 7. We train the model with the batch size B = 256, λ = 1/512 for
1000 epochs.
CIFAR 100 The CIFAR 100 [37] dataset consists of 60,000 RGB images of size 32× 32, from 100 general
object classes. The dataset consists of 500 training images and 100 test images for each class. For this
exeperiments on this dataset, we use ResNet18 [36] without any linear layers, and use the projector with 128
output dimensions. We set the perturbation  = 0.0314 , step size α = 0.007, and the number of iteration
K = 7. We train the model with batch size B = 256, λ = 1/512, and train the model for 1000 epochs.
A.2 Evaluation
Linear evaluation setup In the linear evaluation phase, we train the linear layer ψ on the top of the frozen
encoder f . We train the linear layer for 150 epochs with the learning rate of 0.2. The learning rate is dropped by
a factor of 10 at 30, 50, 100 epoch of the training progress. We use stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimizer
with a momentum of 0.9, weight decay of 5e-4, and train the linear layer with the cross-entropy (CE) loss.
Robust linear evaluation setup For robust linear evaluation, we train the linear layer pi on the top of the
frozen encoder fθ , as done with linear evaluation. We train the linear layer for 150 epochs with an learning rate
of 0.02. The learning rate scheduling and the optimizer setup is the same with the setup for linear evaluation.
We use the project gradient descent (PGD) attack to generate class-wise adversarial examples. We perform `∞
attack with epsilon  = 0.0314 and the step size α = 0.007 for 10 steps.
Robustness evaluation setup For evaluation of adversarial robustness, we use white-box project gradient
descent (PGD) attack. We evaluate under PGD attacks with 20, 40, 100 steps. We set `∞, `2, `1 attacks with
 = 0.0314, 0.072 for `∞,  = 0.25, 0.5 for `2, and  = 7.84, 12 for `1 for testing CIFAR 10 and CIFAR 100.
Transfer learning setup We first briefly describe robust transfer learning and our experiments in its
experimental setting. Shafahi et al. [38] suggest that an adversarially trained model can be transferred to another
model to improve upon its robustness. They used modified WRN 32-10 to train the fully supervised adversarial
model. Moreover, they initialize the student network with an adversarially trained teacher network and utilize the
distillation loss and cross-entropy loss to train the student network’s linear layer on the top of the encoder layer.
We follow the experimental settings of Shafahi et al. [38], and train only the linear layer with cross-entropy
loss. However, we did not use the distillation loss in order to evaluate the robustness of the encoder trained with
our RoCL only (ResNet18). We train the linear model with CIFAR 100 on top of the frozen encoder, which
is trained on CIFAR 10. We also train the linear layer with CIFAR 10 on top of the frozen encoder, which is
trained on CIFAR 100. We train the linear layer for 100 epochs with a learning rate of 0.2. We use stochastic
gradient descent (SGD) for optimization.
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B Algorithm of RoCL
We present the algorithm for RoCL in Algorithm 1. During training, we generate the instance-wise adversarial
examples using contrastive loss and then train the model using two differently transformed images and their
instance-wise adversarial perturbations. We also include a regularization term that is defined as a contrastive loss
between the adversarial examples and clean transformed examples.
Algorithm 1 Robust Contrastive Learning (RoCL)
Input: Dataset D, parameter of model θ, model f , parameter of projector pi, projector p, constant λ
for all iter ∈ number of training iteration do
for all x ∈ minibatch B = {x1, . . . , xm} do
Generate adversarial examples from transformed inputs . instance-wise attacks
t(x)i+1 = ΠB(t(x),)(t(x)
i − αsign(∇t(x)iLcon,θ,pi(t(x)i, {t′(x)}, t(x)neg)))
end for
Ltotal = 1N
∑N
i=1[LRoCL,θ,pi(t(x)i, {t′(x)i, t(x)advi }, {t(x)neg})
+ λLcon,θ,pi(t(x)advi , {t′(x)i}, {t(x)neg})] . Contrastive loss
Optimize the weight θ, pi over Ltotal
end for
C Results of CIFAR 10 and CIFAR 100
While we only report the performance of RoCL on CIFAR 10 in the main paper as the baselines we mainly
compare against only experimented on this dataset, we further report the performance of RoCL on CIFAR 100 as
well (Table 7) and performance against CW attacks [20] (Table 8). We observe that RoCL consistently achieves
comparable performance to that of the supervised adversarial learning methods, even on the CIFAR 100 dataset.
Moreover, when employing the robust linear evaluation, RoCL acquires better robustness over the standard
linear evaluation. Finally, the transformation smoothed classifier further boosts the performance of RoCL on
both datasets.
Table 7: Experimental results with white box attacks on ResNet18 trained on the CIFAR 10 and CIFAR 100
dataset. r-LE denotes robust linear evaluation. AT denotes the supervised adversarial training[9]. All models are
trained with `∞; thus the `∞ is the seen adversarial attack and `2, and `1 attacks are unseen.
Train
type Method
CIFAR10 CIFAR100
Anat
seen unseen
Anat
seen unseen
`∞ `2 `1 `∞ `2 `1
 8/255 16/255 0.25 0.5 7.84 12  8/255 16/255 0.25 0.5 7.84 12
Supervised
LCE 92.82 0.00 0.00 20.77 12.96 28.47 15.56 71.35 0.00 0.00 6.54 2.31 11.14 5.86
AT[9] 81.63 44.50 14.47 72.26 59.26 66.74 55.74 53.97 20.09 6.19 43.08 32.29 40.43 33.18
TRADES[2] 77.03 48.01 22.55 68.07 57.93 62.93 53.79 56.63 17.94 4.29 44.82 33.76 43.70 37.00
Self
-supervised
SimCLR[12] 91.25 0.63 0.08 15.3 2.08 41.49 25.76 57.46 0.04 0.02 6.58 0.7 19.27 12.1
RoCL 83.71 40.27 9.55 66.39 63.82 79.21 76.17 56.13 19.31 4.30 38.65 35.94 50.21 46.67
RoCL + rLE 80.43 47.69 15.53 68.30 66.19 77.31 75.05 51.82 26.27 8.94 41.59 39.86 49.00 46.91
Transformation
smoothed classifier RoCL+tInf 84.11 52.58 18.55 81.15 76.01 82.13 80.40 57.29 26.31 8.16 53.75 46.31 54.53 52.06
Table 8: Experimental results with white box CW attacks [20] on ResNet18 trained on the CIFAR 10. r-LE
denotes robust linear evaluation. All models are trained with `∞
Train type Method
CIFAR10 CIFAR100
Anat CW Anat CW
Self
-supervised
RoCL 83.71 77.35 56.13 44.57
RoCL+rLE 80.43 76.15 51.82 44.77
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D Ablation
In this section, we report the results of several ablation studies of our RoCL model. For all experiments, we
train the backbone network with 500 epochs and train the linear layer with 100 epochs, which yield models with
sufficiently high clean accuracy and robustness. We first examine the effects of the target image when generating
the instance-wise adversarial examples. Along with instance-wise attacks, the regularization term in algorithm 1
can also affect the final performance of the model. To examine lambda’s effect on the transformed images, we
set lambda as λ = 1/128 for CIFAR 10 and λ = 1/256 for CIFAR 100. We also examine the effects of lambda
λ on the CIFAR 10 dataset.
D.1 Adversarial contrastive learning
We examine the effect of the transformation function on the instance-wise attack and the regularization. For
each input instance x, we generated three transformed images t(x), t′(x), and t(x)adv and use them as the
positive set. The results in Table 9 demonstrate that using any transformed images from the same identity
for instance-wise attacks is equally effective. In contrast, for regularization, using images transformed with a
different transformation function from the one used to generate attack helps obtain improved clean accuracy and
robustness.
Instance-wise attack To generate instance-wise attacks, we can decide which identity we will use for
instance-wise attack. Since the original transformed image t(x) and image transformed with another transfor-
mation t′(x) have the same identity, we can use both of them in instance-wise attacks. To find the optimal
perturbation that maximizes the contrastive loss between adversarial examples and same identity images, we
vary X in the following equation:
t(x)i+1 = ΠB(t(x),)(t(x)
i − αsign(∇t(x)iLcon,θ,pi(t(x)i, {X}, t(x)neg))) (9)
where X is either t′(x) and t(x).
Regularization To regularize the learning, we can calculate the contrastive loss between adversarial examples
and clean samples with the same instance-level identity. We vary Y in the regularization term to examine which
identity is the most effective, as follows:
λLcon,θ,pi(t(x)advi , {Y}, {t(x)neg}) (10)
where Y can be t′(x) and t(x).
Table 9: Experimental results with white box attacks on ResNet18 trained on the CIFAR 10 and CIFAR 100
dataset. All models are trained with `∞.
instance-wise attack (X) Regularization (Y) CIFAR 10 CIFAR 100
Method t′(x) t(x) t′(x) t(x) Anat `∞ Anat `∞
RoCL
X - X - 82.79 36.71 55.64 17.56
X - - X 81.47 29.97 53.84 14.18
- X X - 82.43 34.93 55.61 17.42
- X - X 81.96 30.99 53.76 14.74
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D.2 Lambda λ and batch size B
We observe that λ, which controls the amount of regularization in the robust contrastive loss, and the batch
size for calculating the contrastive loss, are two important hyperparameters for our robust contrastive learning
framework. We examine the effect of two hyperparameters in Table 10, and Table 11. We observe that the
optimal lambda λ is different for each batch size B.
Table 10: lambda λ ablation experimental results with white box attacks on ResNet18 trained on the CIFAR 10
dataset. All models are trained with `∞.
`∞
CIFAR 10 λ Anat 8/255 16/255
RoCL
1/16 82.05 35.12 8.05
1/32 82.25 36.02 8.68
1/64 83.00 36.26 8.19
1/128 82.79 36.71 8.34
1/256 82.12 38.05 8.52
1/512 82.68 37.24 8.53
Table 11: Ablation study of the batch size B, for the white box attacks on ResNet18 trained on the CIFAR 10
dataset. All models are trained with `∞ attacks.
`∞
CIFAR 10 B λ Anat 8/255 16/255
RoCL
128 1/128 82.70 37.13 8.98
128 1/256 82.90 36.86 8.89
256 1/256 82.12 38.05 8.52
512 1/256 81.48 34.98 7.42
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